Quaker Religious Thought
Volume 26

Article 2

1-1-1971

The Spirit of the Nation
T Vail Palmer, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/qrt
Part of the Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation
Palmer, Jr., T Vail (1971) "The Spirit of the Nation," Quaker Religious Thought: Vol. 26 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/qrt/vol26/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Quaker Religious Thought by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

repository for unpublished research documents on Quakerism.
They believe that there are many important manuscripts which
are produced but never published which should be made avail
able to persons doing research and study in Quakerism. They
reserve the right to decide which documents are worth filing
and would not encourage persons to send just anything they
had written. They may later have to provide some guidelines
but at present will receive what comes and decide whether to
keep it on file. When they collect enough manuscripts they
will catalog them and perhaps occasionally publish a list
describing the material available at the Earlham library.
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The Spirit of the Nation
T. VAIL PALMER, JR.
is this just a popular slogan,
“For God and country”
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or is He dead? What implications do these
a living reality
questions have for the future of the Christian faith?
To deal with these issues, we need to develop a style of
prophetic historical analysis of the powers at work in society.
By discerning how and where God is at work, the church can
better know where and when it should act. Would such a
prophetic social-historical analysis actually confirm the wide
spread belief that the nation is one of the most fundamental
and effective social units in our world, and its corollary, that
we should look to the organs of the national government as
hearers and executors of the basic moral values of’ our society?
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Yet, as we look today at the social and psychological
sciences, in particular, the question cannot escape us: How far
can we get, through purely “objective” analysis and research?
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Bultmann, clearly, takes the world-view of contemporary
man as normative for theology. Peter Berger, from the stand
point of one of the most contemporary of scientific disciplines,
the sociology of knowledge, points out the fatal Ilaw in Bult
mann’s approach: it is based on
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as afflicted with a false consciousness rooted in
their time, but the contemporary analyst takes the
consciousness of his time as an unmixed intel
lectual blessing.
The perspective of... the sociology of knowl
edge can have a definitely liberating effect. While
other analytic disciplines free us from the dead
weight of the past, sociology frees us from the
t)ranny of the present
The Perspective of
sociology increases our ability to investigate what
ever truth each age may have discovered in its
particular “immediacy to God.”
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In particular, Bultmanu’s approach is far too contemptu
ous of mythological thinking. Modern man
even the modern
probably does find it hard to think in mythological
Christian
not the richer
for this diffi
terms. But he is the poorer
culty. As Amos Wilder has pointed out: “The world’s greatest
myths have always been summary anti symbolic representations
ol essential truths
A myth
carries a weight of spiritual
convey.’’ Rather than
Eruth such as only tIne greatest art can 2
‘dc-mythologize” he Bible, then, we would do far better to
‘re-niythologize” our own understanding of life! At least
some of the myths underlying biblical thought may have the
power to titi ow new and unsuspected light on our understand
ing of ourselves and our environment.
Any attempt 1.0 view the nation-state from a biblical per
spective can hardly avoid taking Romans 13 seriously into
account. Oscar Cullmnann and Clinton Morrison, in particular,
have thrown considerable light on the “mythological’’ worldview which underlies Paul’s thought in Romans 13.
New Testament scholars today generally agree that the
exousja (“authorities” or “powers”), in such passages as Ephe
sians 3:10 and 6:12, Colossjans i:16 and 2:15, 1 Peter 3:22, and
I Corinthians 15:24, are invisible, spiritual beings, such as
angels or demons. Cullmann argues that these same spiritual
powers are referred to in Romans 13, where the word exousiaj
means both those beings and ordinary governments and king
doms on earth. Behind the complex structure of power in
human society, the New Testament thus portrays a vast inter
play of conflict among powerful spiritual forces or beings,
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Clearly, then, the church must understand the deeper
implications of the forces at work in society and in historical
events. We need to supplement our scientific and rational
posvers of observation and thought, with a form of insight
which might well be termed “the ability to distinguish between
spirits” (I Corinthians 12:10). There need to be persons in
the Christian community who have the gift of seeing beyond
even the conscious and subconscious purposes of men in their
actions. There must be Christians who can see which of the
spiritual powers, whose activity is involved in the course of
Heilsgeschichte, is actually advancing through the deeds and
arguments of men in their social antI political activities. This
distinguishing between spirits” is a form of ‘‘prophetic histor
ical analysis’’ which would be particularly appropriate to a
study of the role of the nation in contemporary society.
One of the spiritual powers or exousiai most evidently at
large in the contemporary world is the spirit of nationalism.
The rise of this spirit has paralleled the decline of the influ
ence of the Christian faith in the western world. In this essay
I shall draw on interpretations already made by such scholars
as James Hastings Nichols, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Will
Herbrg, for “raw material” in my attempt to trace the careers
of the Christians’ God and of the spirit of nationalism in the
—
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The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries can be
characterized as the “Confessional period” in Europe. Each
confession was convinced that it alone possessed the Truth.
All other confessions were in error. No Christian confession,
therefore, could see any justification for the existence of the
others. In practical terms, this attitude made religious warare almost inevitable. And for two or three generations, the
history of Europe was characterized by almost chronic religious
especially the French Wars of Religion, the Thirty
wars
Years War in Germany, and the English Civil War. Each
of these wars, of course, was fought on both sides in the name
—
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problems, without theological dictation by the churches. This
attitude was particularly strengthened by the tremendous
growth of the physical sciences. it was an age of great scie[i
tific geniuses, who attained new knowledge through empirical
observation and the exercise of their natural reason. The
successes of science led to the increasing prestige of human
reason and the conviction that reason should also be applied
in human affairs.
By the eighteenth century, a new scientific view of the
Universe was gaining headway. The discoveries, for instance,
of isaac Newton were being popularized by thinkers like Vol
taire. in contrast with the old semi-biblical, semi-Aristotelian
teleological understanding of the natural universe, a new,
mechanical view of nature was becoming the guiding image
for popular thought. The mechanistic physics, which excluded
all ideas of purpose, was proving to be a powerful tool for
increasing man’s understanding of natural processes. From this
viewpoint, which looked on the universe as an enormous
“machine,” biblical language about the world seemed fantastic,
Even though most of the great
nnraculous, incredible.
scientists, including Newton, were themselves Christians, their
discoveries were creating all sorts of intellectual problems for

These wars were sO savagely fought, and the devastation
that iesiiltecl was so great, CSC( ially in Germany, that a
tremendous emotional revulsion had set in by the last quarter
of the seventeenth century. This revulsion was l)lrti(;t11trly
directed against the exclusive dogmatism that had undergirded
the wars. People had become tired to death of dogmatic
theology and of its political consequences. Christian Europe
settled down to accepting the three or four major religious
divisions, winch apparently had to co-exist.
Foe most European villagers, of course, no great adjust
ment of outlook was reqiured at first. The intellectual horizon
was limited to one’s own village and the surrounding farms.
In IhaL area, there was oniy one church; its teachings were,
without question, the ‘truth. The situation was different for
the leaders of society. Businessmen, soldiers, and highly edu
cated pe1o had become aware that elsewhere, beyond their
own villages -ncl towns, there were other men who did not
accept their own formulations of Christianity. Yet they were
acquainted with these other persons, who clearly were fellow
humans and eveit seemed to be decent persons. Thus a sense
of common humanity began to develop across church barriers.
People began to compare various religious faiths and ethical
standards. The increasing awareness of alternative formula
tions, in faith and ethics, led to a growth of skepticism about
time teachirmg.s of the official spokesmen of one’s own church.
For the first lime, traditional church authority (IS such was
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Even more upsetting than the new physics was a new
political faith. Typical leaders of Enlightenment thought were
thinkers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Lessing,
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for Western man a new, “enlightened” faith to live

by. They saw themselves as an emancipated, enlightened, inter
national company of cosmopolitan members of the human race.
They had a great faith in reason and in the perfectibility of
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the human race. F{istory did have a meaning and a purpose.
the idea of progress
A kind of “secular eschatology”
emerged as a key feature of their thinking. if they denied a
last judgment by Jesus Christ, they did trust their actions to a
later judgment by “posterity.” If they denied the old picture
of a New Jerusalem at the end of the age, they were convinced
that history was progressing toward an ideal social order
“a kind of bourgeois heaven.”
within history
By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the idea of
progress was becoming more and more intensifIed. Enlighten
ment mcii were cxpecting an impending climax; they were
hoping for an imminent fulfillment of their social dreams.
a
in the French Revolution
This climax soon arrived
revolution based on a “religion of humanity,” complete with
its own martyrs, saints, and festival clays. In the French
Revolution, Reason was even put forth as a new goddess to
lead the people.
But the new Enlightenment faith in reason and human
goodness was already being undermined from within. A lead
ing jhilosophe, Diderot, was moving toward a deterministic
psychology
which left no room for any distinctions between
right and wrong. Even more seriously, a rigorous philosopher,
David Hume, was demonstrating, on the Enlightenment’s own
premises, that reason is not competent to answer the major
questions of life. There was no rational proof of deity, pur
pose, or morality. When the scientific method was consistently
applied to human concerns, it undercut the ethical assumptions
of thc philosophes. With Hume, faith in reason turned into
an ultimate skepticism. Even the scientific method itself was
shown to have no underlying rational justification. Reason was,
in any case, too impersonal a spirit to capture the warm,
passionate loyalty of many people for long. Now it had proved
to be too frail a ghost even to carry its own weight. Christianity
had been rejected; Reason had disintegrated. What god was
left?
A new god was waiting in the wings, to make its dramatic
entry onto the world’s stage during the French Revolution. For
many centuries, this god had been laying the groundwork for

its ultimate triumph. It had lost an early skirmish when
Henry II did penance at Becket’s tomb in 1174. It had grown
strong enough to defy successfully the claims of the papacy,
when Philip the Fair imprisoned Boniface VIII in 1303. It was
an important ally of 1-luss’ reform in the fifteenth century and
of Luther’s in the sixteenth. But even then, the spirit of the
nation hatE been only a supporting actor on the stage of world
history. Nationalism, aS a significant, primary force, first came
forth to center stage at the time of the French Revolution.
Only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has nationalism
become the dominant religion of the masses in Western
civilization.
At the rime of the French Revolution, the Third Estate
declared that they were the people
and the people should
rule. The concept of popular sovereignty was asserted, against
the old hierarchical concept of government. In principle, all
were included as l)articipants in the nation. French
nationalism was founded on a covenant, consciously celebrated
in 1790, when “in every commune
the oath to la patric
was taken, often around an open-air altar.”
4 The spirit of the
nation was personified in Marianne (to be followed by such
divinities as John Bull and Uncle Sam).
“The people”
became a collective personality, a true mystical body.
The national state, of course, had already developed
unprecedented power in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen
turies, and had largely superseded the old centers of power
religious authorities, the emperor, the feudal nobility. But this
power was largely imposed on the people by absolute monarchs.
The new characteristic of national power, which emerged at
the end of the eighteenth century, was a widespread and deepseated sense, among the people, of participation in government
anti national life. This nationalistic spirit rapidly established
institutional means for perpetuating itself. The public school
system was first set up in France as a device of the Enlighten
ment. The hope had been to get education away from the
priests antI thus to outflank the church by raising an “enlight
ened” generation of the nation’s youth. This public school
system was readily transformed into a means of training
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chilclrc.n iii devotion to the fatherland. In many nations, this
public education has been made universal and compulsory;
an(I the school system is held accountable for any slips or
deviations from the national cult. Many religious devices and
shrines,
)ractices have been borrowed Irons Christianity
1
flag,
the
rituals,
clays,
hoiy
anthems,
and
saints, altars, hymns
history
and
journalism
professions,
the
censorship. Among
have particularly become agents of nationalism.
The spirit o[ nationalism spread rapidly from France
through Europe and America in the nineteenth century, and
on through Asia an(i Africa in the twentieth century. With
nationalism came a great increase in time exercise of personal
responsibility in society. Nationalism brought to men anti
women a new sense of dignity, exaltation, anti fulfillment,
beyond the spheres of private and family or clan life. Even in
recent decades, nationalism has been primarily a releasing
force in Asia and Africa.
Nationalism was not the only new religion to emerge in
Europe. From the early days of the Reformation, as Weber
and others have pointed out, there was a close alliance between
Protestantisnc and the emerging capitalist economic structure.
This alliance was only strengthened with the coming of the
Industrial Revolution. By the middle of the nineteenth cen
tiny, especially in central Europe, Protestantism in pai’ticular
had become identified as the religion of the bourgeoisie, of
the wielders of economic and political power. The rapidly
growing class of industrial workers was forced by economic
necessity into hostility toward the owners of industry. Not
surprisingly, they were increasingly alienated from, and hostile
to, Christianity. They were more and more turning toward
some form of socialism or communism as an answer to their
misery. Marx anti Engels could thus write in 1848: “A spectre
Communism.”
the spectre of 5
is haunting Europe
With prophetic fervor, Marx formulated a version of
communism that claimed scientific objectivity for itself. Thus
undergirched with a respctable philosophical foundation,
Marxist socialism had become a formidable political force in
Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. It also served
—

—

12

as a religious substitute for the discredited Christianity, among
many in the working classes. Marx had proclaimed that the
interests of the working classes were international in scope;
not a parochial nation but the world-wide proletariat was the
bearer of historical destiny. He had sounded his challenge:
“Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution.
The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They
6
have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!”
And the workers were uniting in a grand Socialist Inter
national which had great hopes of gaining its triumph in
Europe through the very parliamentary processes that now
afforded the bourgeoisie their political control of the nations
of Europe.
The fatal weakness of socialist internationalism was
revealed, however, in the fateful days when World War I broke
out in a largely unsuspecting Europe. The Socialist parties in
the self-justifications
and believed
each nation listened to
of their respective national governments, and stampeded into
line behind the national war efforts. The Socialist Inter
national was completely shattered. In the council of the gods,
Vaterland had emergeci completely victorious from his struggle
with the Dialectic of History.
One of the lust to see antI condemn this betrayal of social
ism to the nationalist spirit was Lenin. He returned to his
native Russia and presided over a rebirth of socialism, purged
of its alliance with nationalism, in the Russian Revolution
of 1917.
The nation, for all of its strengths and triumphs, does
have one obvious failing as a god. It simply is not supreme
and all-pow’erful; it is only one of many such gods, all corn
peting for first place on Mt. Olympus. Such parochial and
local gods have, throughout history, had a notorious tendency
to succumb anti disappear in any contest with a more univer
salist faith.
Why has nationalism, then, proved so successful in its
encounters with such universalist rivals as Christianity, the
Enlightenment, and Socialism? Part of the explanation, at
least, has been nationalism’s enormous capacity for syncretism.
—
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Ar the outset, in the early nineteenth century, most nation
alists still affirmed the Enlightenment faith in common human
ity. They were conFident that, once the old aristocratic and
royal rulers were swept away, the bonds of universality and of
peace would be strengthened. Once the people were liberated
and were in charge, they would readily recognize that in all
nations they were inspired by the same universal ideals of
[reedom, tolerance, and peace. Thus all peoples would pursue
their national destinies in harmony with one another.
But the Enlightenment had run its course. The reality
turned out to be far different from the promise. The spirit
of nationalism, once victorious, proved to be exclusive and
intolerant. National jealousies were now far stronger and more
deep-seated than the old rivalries among the princes.
Many people, o[ course, were uneasy in conscience. They
still had memories of the universal moralities preached by
Christianity and by the Enlightenment. The nationalist spirit
could not have prevailed, had it not found an escape for such
uneasy consciences. In the twentieth century, a few of the
great nations have solved this problem by identifying them
selves with great ethical principles or sets of values, which can
claim to be universally valid. Men recognized that their own
nations stood for such great principles as liberty, equality,
justice, or fraternity. It was not difficult to jump to the
conclusion that one’s own nation possessed the true morality,
which all men should follow. Each particular nation claims
that its own values should be universally recognized. The
other nations are wrong; hence their ethical systems should be
suppressed. The situation is strangely parallel to that of the
confessional states of the early seventeenth century:
within
Nations no longer oppose each other.
values,
common
and
a framework of shared beliefs
which imposes effective limitations upon the ends
and means of their struggle for power. They
oppose each other now as the standard-bearers of
ethical systems, each of them of national origin
and each of them claiming and aspiring to pro
vide a supranational framework of moral stand.
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arcls which all the other nations ought to accept
and within which their foreign policies ought to
operate. The moral code of one nation flings the
challenge of its universal claim into the face of
another, which reciprocates in kind.
The stage
is set for a contest among nations whose stakes are
the ability to impose upon the other contes
tants a new universal political and moral system
recreated in the image of the victorious nation’s
political and moral convictions.
Lenin had set out to l)ujldl a non-nationalistic communism
in Russia. But his dream was rapidly transformed. By the
nineteen-thirties, Communist parties throughout the world had
already been reduced to the status of pawns for Russian foreign
policy. The real resurgence of Russian nationalism, however,
came during ‘World WTar II, when the deep penetration of
Russia by German armies aroused and united the Russian
people in a reawakened national fervor. At the end of the
war, this nationalist spirit, now identified with the idealism
of communist morality, expressed itself in the establishment
of Communist regimes by Russian arms throughout eastern
Europe and in Russian support for successful Communist
revolutions in the Far East.
An even more remarkable synthesis of nationalism with
democratic values and Judo-Christiari religion has come to
fruition in the United States of America. More and more in
recent decades, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews have come to
think of themselves as simply three varieties of one true
religion. All three major groups tend to identify the basic
common faith, which they share, with the “American way of
life” and the spiritual values of democracy. This “religion
of America” is identified with “democracy in a peculiarly
American sense
individualistic, dynamic, pragmatic,
humanitarian, ‘for’i’ard looking’, optimistic.8
.
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By and large, the “common faith” of American
society remains implicit... By the great mass of
the American people the American Way of Life
operates as a “common faith”.., through its
pervasive influence on the patterns of American
thought and feeling. It makes no pretensions to
15

override or supplant the recognized religions, to
which it assigns a place of great eminence and
honor in the American scheme of things. But all
the implications are there.°
The contemporary triumph of this “nationalistic univer
salism’ can be seen in such diverse developments as Woodrow
Wilson’s crusade to “make the world safe for democracy,”
Maoist China’s claim to be time “vanguard of the revolution,”
code
and even the claim of the Na7is to possess a new moral
deca
and
[or the whole world, superior to vicious bolshevism
world
(lent democracy. Time most powerful nations in the
profess;
they
have become missionaries for the values which
their
aiicl they of course claim to incarnate these values in
century
this
in
own internal structures. Thus have the nations
of
successfully asserted their claim to the religious loyalties
at
life”
of
men. Ea(h major nation now has a whole “way
has,
politics
stake in the international struggle. International
in effect, become the staging ground for the contests between
rival gods:
However munch the content and objectives of
today’s ethics of nationalistic universalism may
djlfer from those of pmitie tribes or of the
Thirty Years’ War, they do not differ in the func
tion they fulfill for international politics, and in
Thus, carrying
the moral c]imate they create.
masses
nationalistic
the
them,
their idols before
of our time meet in the international arena, each
group convinced that it executes the mandate of
history, that it does for humanity what it seems to
do for itself, and that it fulfills a sacred mission
0
ordamed by Providence, however defined.’
In three centuries, Western civilization appears to have
come lull circle, back to a situation strikingly similar to that
of time Confessional period. Again, states stand for competing
versions of the ultimate truth. Each “confession” alone pos
sesses the truth, and cannot tolerate the existence of its rivals.
Warfare has again attained a level of savagery, an inclusive
ness of scope, and a degree of devastation comparable with
that of the great wars of religion, and far exceeding that of
warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
.
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Clearly the syimcretisnm with nationalism must be an uneasy
be it Christi
one [or any international, universalist religion
of these
any
If
aility, Communism, Buddhism, or Islam.
the 5)11of
future
religions retains any vitality of its own, the
passage
his
thesis must be in question. Morgenthau concluded
in the
time
our
on the meeting of the nationalistic masses of
they
do
“Little
international arena with the cryptic comment:
gods
the
from
which
know that they meet under an empty sky
have 11
departed.” Is there any sign that the peoples may
realize that “the gods have departed”? Nichols concluded his
account of nationalism as a new religion with the question:
Will these wars result as did the Christians’ religious wars,
in a similar reaction. and weariness against the current ortho
enlightenment’?”
’
doxy. in a ‘new 1
Nichols asked his question in 1958. A dozen years later,
there is some evidence that the reaction may he well under
way. In the United States, the breaking-point seems to have
come as a consequence of the contradictions involved in the
Vietnam war. Since Communism is the chief rival of the
American Way of Life, it has been readily identified as the
source of evil in today’s world. At the very least,
any attempt by Conununism to win new adherents must be
resisted to the death. This attitude has necessarily dictated
American intervention in Vietnam, since Communism was
clearly threatening to spread southward in that land. On the
other hand, a primary value affirmed in the American creed
for
is “freedom,” interpreted to mean self-determination
individuals and for such primary social units as families,
business enterprises, and nations. To informed Americans,
however, it has become increasingly clear that genuine self
determination in Vietnam might well mean that that nation
would choose to “go Communist.” American intervention in
potentially and
South Vietnam has thus been recognized as
of “freedom”
adversary
primary
the
actually
even
perhaps
term.
the
in that land, as Americans have understood
Most of American society has been able to ignore the
dilemma, simply by refusing to admit the possibility that any
people could conceivably want to be Communist. The aca
—

—

—
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The only available ideology of protest has been Marxism; but
Marxism is as fundamentally compromised with the demon of
nationalism as are Christianity and democracy. There is a
widespread religious groping, an experimentation with every
thing from witchcraft to the I Ching. A god has died; the
search is on for his successor, but the new god has not yet
revealed himself.
If there is any hope for Christian renewal, if “through the
church tile manifold wisdom of God might now be made
known to the principalities and exomtsiai in tile heavenly
places” (Ephesians 3:10), a crucial locus today for this revela
tion must be an active encounter with the student radicals.
At the very least, an honest, prophetic church should be able
to recognize that the Christian faith is not identical with the
American “religion of democracy” and thus able to meet the
radicals on their own terms, in a mutual quest for a religious
understanding and commitment adequate to our times.

clemic community in America, however, has sufficiently valued
the ideal of openness to objective evidence, that it has had to
lace up to the facts of the situation. The result has been an
agonizing recognition that the very premises of tile American
national ideal are mutually inconsistent.
‘This result has been especially dramatic among students.
Having invested less of their lives already in commitment to
the American Way of Life, they have been freer to reject that
religion outright than have most older members of the aca
demic community. Elhus the amazingly widespread student
protests against the Vietnam war have taken place in an
even snore far-reaching context: a style-of-life that deliberately
dramatizes a wholesale rejection of the American Way of Life
at least as that Way has worked out in historical reality. For
but not in the sense
the student radicals, God truly is dead
intended by Altizer and Hamilton. The god whose death is
now being announced is not the God whose obituary Nietzsche
pronounced. ft is the exonsza of American nationalistic uni
versalism, the Author of this country’s “manifest destiny,” who
at least to the younger portion of the intellectual
has died
—

—
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Even its intolerance, its violence have something
in common with the intolerance of the philo
.sophes who paved the way for the Revolution in
the 18th century. The “burn, baby, burn” of
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the American Blacks; but, to me, yelled as it is
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much the same ring as the “Ecrasez i’m fame” of
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In light of the analysis which I have developed here, the
place of critical decision today is not in ‘Washington, but on
the university campuses. The student movement is clear in
what it is rejecting; it does not yet know where it is going.
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